Mishnah *Arakhin, chapter 4*

(1) Regarding the sufficiency of means [i.e., the laws, regarding one too poor to pay his pledge, see Leviticus 27:8], this goes according to the ability of the **one who vows** and [when one vows the set values] of age, this goes according to the **subject of the vow** [and not the one who is making the vow, i.e., if a minor vows the value of an elder he pays, not his own value, but rather, the value of the elder].

Regarding valuations [of a man or a woman], this is according to the one who is the subject of the valuation. And the valuations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the valuation. “Regarding the sufficiency of means (see Leviticus 27:8), this is according to the ability of the **one who vows**” — how so? If a poor man pledged the evaluation of a rich man, he shall pay only the valuation of a poor man [i.e., according to his means to pay]. But if a rich man evaluated a poor man, he must pay the valuation of a rich man [i.e., the values set according to the age bracket of the subject vowed stated in Leviticus 27].

(2) But this is not so regarding sacrifices. If a man said: “I take upon myself the offering of this leper,” and the leper was poor, he brings the offering of a poor leper [i.e., one sheep, a tenth *eifah* of flour and a log of oil] (see Leviticus 14:21-32). But if the leper was rich, he must bring the offering of a rich leper [two male sheep, one female sheep, three tenths *eifah* of flour and one log of oil] (see Leviticus 14:10). Rebbi says: I say the same applies regarding a valuation...
where it is similar to the case of the leper. Rebbi disagrees with the Tanna of the Mishnah, for according to the former, a poor man would under all circumstances incur no liability beyond that of his means, even though he heard the rich man vow his own valuation, and thereupon the poor man said: “I take upon myself what this man has said.” According to Rebbi, however, in such a case, the poor man would be liable to pay the rich man’s valuation, since in saying: “I take upon myself what this man has said,” he deliberately assumes the full liability, and he would owe that sum until he was able to pay it. For why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man, obliged to pay only the valuation of a poor man [i.e., according to his ability to pay]? Because the rich man had not incurred any liability [therefore the poor man means the evaluation according to the rich man’s age bracket set by Scripture, the fact that he is wealthy has no bearing to the vow]. But if the rich man said: “I evaluate myself,” and the poor man, upon hearing this, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the full valuation of the rich man [even if he can’t afford it and must pay up when he can]. If he was poor [at the time he took the vow] and then became rich [before he paid], or rich [at the time of the vow] and then became poor [if at any time from when making the vow until payment he was rich] he must pay the valuation of a rich man. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if he was poor [when he took the vow] and then became rich [before he paid], or rich [at the time of the vow] and then became poor [if at any time from when making the vow until payment he was rich] he must pay the valuation of a rich man. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if he was poor [when he took the vow] and became rich and then again became poor [if at any time from when making the vow until payment he was rich] he must pay the valuation of a rich man.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if his [the leper’s] father was dying and [subsequently] left him ten thousand coins or his
ship at sea was rented out for ten thousand [coins], the Temple has no claim at all on them [rather his status always remains as it was at the time the obligation was set].

(4) “Regarding the years [i.e., the set values of age], this is [valued] according to [the age of] the subject of the vow — how so? If a youth [from age 20 to 60] evaluates an old man [from age sixty], he must pay the valuation of an old man [namely fifteen sela]. And if an old man evaluates a youth [i.e., he said, pointing to one who was twenty years old: The valuation of this one upon me], he must pay the valuation of a youth [i.e., fifty sela].

“Regarding valuations, this is according to the one who is the subject of the valuation — how so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the valuation of a woman [according to her age as set by Scripture], and if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the valuation of a man [according to his age as set by Scripture]. “And the valuation depends upon the time of the valuation” — how so? If a person evaluated one who was less than five years of age [whose value is set at five sela], and [in the meantime before he had a chance to pay] he became older than five years of age [whose value is now set at twenty sela]; or [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age [i.e., twenty sela] and [before he had a chance to pay] he became twenty years old, [in all these cases] he pays [only] in accordance with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is accounted as below the age [i.e., if he evaluated

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לאחרים רבעיא, שיא ידידי אלא אינא מסתצוה. מסתצוה שביעות ולא עשיר ווא. ד slimeעריצי
משתכלות אלא שתייה, מנהמה שעפשים עני, ואתו. מנהמה תמקות וענזה ולא עשיר ווא. ד slimeעריצי
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אלא מים לה רבוד ידידי מסתצוה, ודיב מכין שלא מסתצוה, דל. ותא, לע鄠 fram ש חוות שלקש: וחת בום וחק: דבניא (שפ) חקך ויתא שיא ולא כים וחק.
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an infant on its thirtieth day of life, he owes nothing, since evaluations start from the end of the thirtieth day]. The fifth or twentieth year itself, is accounted as under this age. For it is written: “And if from sixty years and upward” (Leviticus 27:7) [meaning that only upward of sixty is above sixty]. We thus learn all other ages from what is said regarding sixty years; just as the sixtieth year [itself] is accounted under this age, so too, the fifth and twentieth years, are also accounted as under this age. But is that so?! Just because [the Torah] has reckoned the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent [requiring a payment of fifty rather than fifteen *sela*], shall the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age as well, thereby causing a leniency [by requiring a lesser payment]? Scripture states: “Years,” “Years,” to teach by analogy: just as with the sixtieth year the word “Years” means that it is to be accounted under age, so too, the word “Years” with the fifth year and with the twentieth year means that it is to be accounted under age, regardless whether this is a leniency or a stringency. Rabbi Eleazar says: [This rule applies] until they are a month and a day beyond the relevant years [he adds an additional month to the above].

Rabbi Eleazar bar Shimeon said: ’The Torah states: “And if from sixty years and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), meaning that only upward of sixty is above sixty. We thus learn all other ages from what is said regarding sixty years; just as the sixtieth year [itself] is accounted under this age, so too, the fifth and twentieth years, are also accounted as under this age. But is that so?! Just because [the Torah] has reckoned the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent [requiring a payment of fifty rather than fifteen *sela*], shall the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age as well, thereby causing a leniency [by requiring a lesser payment]? Scripture states: “Years,” “Years,” to teach by analogy: just as with the sixtieth year the word “Years” means that it is to be accounted under age, so too, the word “Years” with the fifth year and with the twentieth year means that it is to be accounted under age, regardless whether this is a leniency or a stringency. Rabbi Eleazar says: [This rule applies] until they are a month and a day beyond the relevant years [he adds an additional month to the above].